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China’s property bust has left millions of families paying mortgages on homes that were sold to them but never finished, concrete “rotten tail” towers that embody a boom’s broken promises. In places like Zhoukou, a once-hopeful development marketed as “classic Chinese living” now sits as a lanweilou, a “rotten tail” building: a project that began with glossy optimism and ended as a stranded ruin. The developer is bankrupt, its boss in prison, and a handful of residents live among empty shells, so isolated that they call each other when they get home, just to confirm they made it safely through the desolation. This is not a local tragedy. It is a nationwide residue of the pre-sale model that financed China’s boom: developers sold apartments before construction to raise cash, and when the market turned, the money dried up, leaving millions of buyers trapped in unfinished promises. Estimates cited suggest roughly 20 million presold homes were unfinished as of 2023. The implied scale of frozen household wealth is staggering, trillions of yuan tied up in projects that cannot be easily sold, valued, or escaped. The result is a drag not only on GDP growth but on social trust: people continue paying mortgages on homes they cannot inhabit, and the state must manage a crisis that is as psychological as it is financial. Becoming a lanweilou resident is, in itself, a kind of surrender. Some buyers move into buildings before utilities are fully connected, choosing shelter over dignity. Even where electricity and water exist, life is defined by friction, residents refusing to pay maintenance fees, property managers retaliating by shutting down elevators, daily reminders that the legal ownership of an apartment does not guarantee a livable home. Many know they cannot leave: the flats are effectively untradeable. Beijing’s response is not to refund, but to finish, slowly, selectively, and with the political logic of containment. The state’s “guaranteed delivery” program, launched in 2022, created whitelists of stalled developments and pushed banks to extend credit so construction could resume. Trillions of yuan in loans have been approved, though much of it appears aimed at rolling over debt rather than injecting fresh life into projects. The objective is less to restore wealth than to prevent revolt: complete enough buildings to extinguish the most combustible anger, while avoiding the precedent of mass compensation. Because refunds are the one thing the system cannot afford. The article’s most chilling lesson comes from a couple who sued to recover their money, only to lose because the project was judged “close to completion.” For them, completion is not salvation, t is a trap. If they take delivery, they may inherit an asset worth far less than what they paid, possibly half. If the project failed entirely, they might at least have a path to exit their mortgage. In a normal market, that might be a consumer dispute. In China’s housing system, it is a political problem: if refunds became common, millions more would demand the same, banks would absorb losses, and unfinished projects could be abandoned permanently. The state’s priority is to prevent the logic of escape from spreading.
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Continuing Conflicts
Sudan’s foreign ministry has accused Uganda of crossing a moral and diplomatic line by receiving RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) framing President Yoweri Museveni’s meeting with him as “direct support” for what Khartoum describes as crimes of genocide. The language is deliberately scorching, less the careful prose of routine diplomatic protest than an attempt to brand the encounter itself as complicity. In Sudan’s telling, this was not neutral engagement; it was a public gesture that validates a paramilitary leader the state now treats as a terrorist and an architect of mass violence. The statement casts Uganda’s reception as an affront not only to Sudanese sovereignty but to basic humanitarian values. It points to atrocities attributed to the RSF that it says have been documented internationally and condemned by regional bodies, including the African Union, institutions to which Uganda belongs. In other words, Khartoum is arguing that Museveni’s move is not merely unfriendly; it is inconsistent with the norms Uganda publicly claims to uphold through regional membership. The subtext is about legitimacy: Sudan insists it is the internationally recognized authority, and that welcoming Hemedti amounts to treating a rebel commander as a peer. Yet even in condemnation, the ministry’s statement reveals the constraints of power. It acknowledges Uganda’s sovereign right to host whomever it chooses and to pursue bilateral relations as it sees fit, then immediately warns that this may indicate a “new policy” supportive of Hemedti. That rhetorical pivot, conceding sovereignty while alleging betrayal, signals how fragile Sudan’s regional environment has become. When states are fighting for survival at home, every handshake abroad becomes a battlefield over recognition, narrative, and future leverage. Uganda’s choice is also legible through its own political instincts. Museveni has long positioned himself as a regional broker, welcoming armed actors, mediating conflicts, and maintaining channels that can be converted into influence. But mediation is rarely perceived as mediation by the side that is bleeding. For Khartoum, this meeting looks less like diplomacy than like abandonment: a neighbor offering a platform to a man it blames for mass killing, displacement, and the shredding of the state. What matters is not only the insult, but the precedent. If a regional leader can openly host an RSF commander while Sudan’s war continues, it suggests that the RSF is not being treated as an outlaw force everywhere, it is being treated as an unavoidable actor. That is precisely what terrifies governments fighting internal challengers: once the international taboo weakens, insurgent legitimacy can be slowly built through meetings, photos, and the quiet normalization of the unthinkable.
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Europe
Spain is being accused of doing what Europe has spent years warning against: treating a “high-risk” supplier as if risk were a matter of branding rather than national security. Lawmakers in the European Parliament are now publicly rebuking Madrid for a contract linked to Huawei technology used to store judicial wiretaps, an unusually sensitive category of state data, arguing that Spain is handing a foreign vendor the “crown jewels” of law enforcement. The dispute is not only about Spain’s procurement choices; it is about whether the EU can function as a security bloc when member states apply radically different definitions of acceptable risk. At the center is a contract awarded last year that drew backlash early and never really cooled. The United States reportedly threatened to curtail intelligence-sharing with Madrid over the arrangement, and the controversy has since become a proxy battle for a much larger European dilemma: how to protect digital sovereignty when the continent still runs critical systems on equipment it has politically downgraded but not operationally removed. Brussels has called Huawei a high-risk supplier and is now pushing draft legislation that would move from voluntary “toolbox” guidance to an enforceable requirement, forcing member states to exclude Huawei (and similar suppliers) from telecom networks and critical infrastructure if the law passes. European lawmakers are increasingly treating Spain’s choice as a collective hazard rather than a domestic matter. One senior cyber legislator warned that the problem is not merely a local breach scenario but the contamination of trust across borders: when one member state purges high-risk vendors while another uses them in sensitive justice and surveillance systems, intelligence-sharing becomes politically and operationally brittle. In plain terms, if partners doubt Spain’s data custody, they may stop sending it, turning procurement into a quiet veto on cooperation. Another Spanish opposition lawmaker framed it as a risk to the “entirety of the EU,” a familiar escalation that reflects how quickly technical decisions become alliance disputes. Madrid’s defense is procedural: officials say the contract was awarded to “European companies,” which then purchased storage products, and they insist there is no foreign interference or threat to evidence custody. The interior ministry argues the system is legally and technically secure; government-aligned voices emphasize “watertight” design features, audited, isolated, certified, implying the Huawei component is contained and non-critical. Supporters in the European Parliament echo this line, rejecting the idea that EU institutions should intervene and insisting the arrangement does not compromise sovereignty. But the political reality is harsher than the technical assurances. Surveillance infrastructure is not judged only by encryption standards and compliance certificates; it is judged by who is trusted, who is distrusted, and who has leverage. Huawei is not merely a vendor in this debate, it is a symbol of China’s strategic reach and of Europe’s unresolved dependency. Once a supplier is labeled “high-risk,” the burden shifts: governments can still use it, but they must accept that allies may treat their assurances as self-serving. What this episode exposes is a deeper institutional contradiction inside the EU. Europe wants the credibility of a unified security perimeter without the discipline of uniform security policy. It wants common threat assessments while allowing national procurement to remain a patchwork of exceptions and workarounds. And it wants intelligence solidarity while tolerating decisions that allies perceive as avoidable vulnerabilities. In that gap, every contract becomes a referendum on seriousness.
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Asia
Southeast Asia’s newest anti-corruption pitch is one of the oldest an dmost stereotypical: If the people give the state sharper teeth, it will remove graft and corruption out of the system. In Jakarta, President Prabowo Subianto has revived the strongman logic in plain terms, suggesting that “a little bit of authoritarianism” may be necessary to uproot corruption, framing concentrated power not as a threat to democracy but as a practical instrument of cleanliness. The appeal is emotionally intuitive in societies exhausted by bribery, patronage, and impunity: if institutions won’t work, perhaps a fist will. But the argument turns on a dangerous sleight of hand. Authoritarianism can punish corruption, yes, but especially the corruption of rivals. What it struggles to eliminate is the deeper issue that produces corruption in the first place: opaque procurement, unaccountable political funding, elite capture, and the quiet conversion of public office into private advantage. Crackdowns can be real and still be selective; courts can be active and still be captive. The question is not whether an authoritarian government can stage arrests. The question is whether it will ever arrest itself. The region offers plenty of seductive examples. Singapore’s reputation as a tightly managed but unusually clean state is regularly invoked as proof that firm rule works, an orderly city-state with tough enforcement, high administrative capacity, and a leadership tradition that made “clean government” part of its legitimacy. Other non-democratic or semi-democratic systems point to strong CPI rankings or visible prosecutions as evidence that repression and integrity can coexist. Vietnam’s sweeping “blazing furnace” campaign, which has toppled senior figures, is often held up as another case of authoritarian anti-graft energy with real bite. Yet the comparisons are slippery, because the definitions are narrow. Much of what is counted as “corruption” in popular indexes emphasizes bribery and transactional graft, who takes cash, who sells permits, who skims contracts, more than the broader abuse of public power that occurs when political competition is throttled and accountability is vertical rather than civic. A state can look “clean” while still being structurally abusive: legal opposition fenced in, media disciplined, watchdogs neutered, and power enjoyed as a permanent entitlement. From that angle, authoritarian “cleanliness” can resemble a house with polished floors and locked doors, orderly, yes, but for whose benefit? Prabowo’s own political symbolism sharpens the unease. His rhetoric about strong rule lands in a country where youth-led protests recently surged over corruption and inequality, and where heavy-handed policing and intimidation reportedly followed. It also lands in a political culture that still remembers what authoritarian stability can cost, especially when leaders romanticize past dictatorships as national glory. When a government claims that liberty must be trimmed to fight corruption, it is often asking for something that cannot be easily returned. The more sobering lesson is that anti-corruption success depends less on regime type than on the harder, less cinematic ingredients: courts that can resist phone calls, investigators who can follow money upward, procurement that can be audited, meritocratic bureaucracies that don’t sell jobs, and a press that can publish what the state would prefer to bury. Without those, “anti-corruption” becomes a performance, useful for disciplining enemies, cleansing reputations, and rearranging patronage networks while keeping the core bargain intact. In systems like these corruption does not disappear, rather, it is consolidated.
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Africa
In Kampala, even prayer now requires permission. Hundreds of supporters of jailed opposition figure Kizza Besigye gathered at Lubaga Cathedral for a public service demanding his release after more than a year in detention without trial on treason charges, only to be told the event had been postponed. They stayed anyway, singing hymns, praying, and turning a cancelled mass into a defiant act of presence. The episode captured something increasingly ordinary in Uganda: the state’s reach extending beyond courts and streets into the rituals that once offered neutral ground. The service was meant to be led by the archbishop of Kampala, but church officials said it was delayed because “issues” were still being discussed to ensure “harmony.” Winnie Byanyima, the UNAIDS director and Besigye’s wife, told attendees the archbishop had relayed President Yoweri Museveni’s request to postpone the event while authorities examined whether it was political. Her words were blunt: the mass did not happen because the president ordered it. The government did not need to storm the cathedral to make its point; it merely had to signal that even worship might be treated as dissent. Besigye’s case has become a measure of Uganda’s political atmosphere. A four-time presidential candidate and once the country’s most prominent opposition figure, he has appeared in court in a wheelchair and has been repeatedly denied bail, while supporters warn his health is failing and argue he should be allowed independent medical care. The charge, treason, carrying the possibility of the death penalty, casts the state’s narrative in its harshest form: dissent as existential threat. Museveni says Besigye must answer for serious allegations and calls for a quick trial, yet the trial has still not formally begun after more than a year, leaving punishment to operate through delay. Besigye’s story is equally concerning. He disappeared in Nairobi in November 2024, then reappeared in Uganda facing a military tribunal on national security accusations before the case was shifted to civilian court and reframed as treason. The sequence, vanishing, military processing, then civilian prosecution, signals a state that uses every available venue to maintain control, moving the case between jurisdictions as needed while the accused remains contained. The ugliest edge, however, comes from the regime’s inner circle. Museveni’s son, Gen. Muhoozi Kainerugaba, the army commander and widely seen as a potential successor, has publicly branded Besigye “a dead man walking,” while alleging he plotted to kill his father. In Uganda’s political language, such statements are not mere rhetoric; they are a warning about what power thinks it can do without consequence. When a general speaks this way about a detainee, the boundary between legal process and political vendetta becomes dangerously thin. /
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Middle East
Iran’s universities have reopened, but the students describe returning to class as a kind of moral betrayal. More than 45 days after January’s crackdown, campus protests have flared again across Tehran and in Mashhad, driven not by the illusion of safety but by an insistence that grief cannot be scheduled around an academic calendar. One student put it with brutal clarity: “Our classrooms are empty because the graveyards are full.” In that line is the entire refusal, students rejecting the state’s demand that society resume “normality” while bodies are still being counted. The Guardian’s reporting frames this new wave as both spontaneous and inevitable. Students gathered at the start of term amid heavy security and plainclothes officers at gates, but vigils and sit-ins quickly turned into chants, and then into clashes. At Sharif University, a quiet memorial reportedly became a protest the moment students began speaking, as if the pressure of silence had simply run out. The symbolic value mattered as much as any tactical objective: a visible statement that the regime could not erase the dead by reopening classrooms, and could not rewrite mass killing as a foreign-backed disturbance without inviting contempt. The interviews underscore how the state’s narratives now collide with lived memory. Students describe watching classmates gunned down, then hearing those deaths dismissed as the work of “terrorists” or foreign agents. What they are resisting is not only violence, but defamation, death followed by propaganda, mourning followed by blame. In this telling, returning to lectures becomes participation in the lie that the country has recovered, that the rupture was temporary, that the state can kill at scale and still demand obedience in the language of order.
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Americas
Mexico has killed “El Mencho,” but the country’s cartel map does not collapse when one kingpin falls, it reconfigures. As the government celebrates the death of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel’s leader, the violence that followed, highways blocked, cars torched, coordinated attacks across multiple states, served as a blunt reminder that these organizations are built to survive decapitation. The state can remove a man; it cannot remove the system of money, protection, and fear that keeps the enterprise functioning. And the list of major figures still at large makes clear that Mexico’s war is entering a new, more unstable chapter rather than closing an old one. One looming fault line sits inside the Sinaloa Cartel, where succession has become open conflict. Ismael Zambada Sicairos, known as “El Mayito Flaco,” is described as a key leader within the cartel’s “La Mayiza” faction, rising after the 2024 arrest of his father, the longtime trafficker “El Mayo.” He is portrayed as a deliberate, low-profile operator, an archetype that often lasts longer than the flamboyant narco celebrity. If El Mencho represented a cartel that advertised itself through terror and spectacle, Zambada’s camp is framed as the opposite: endurance through discretion, networks, and control of distribution. Across from him stands another inheritance project: Iván Archivaldo Guzmán Salazar, “El Chapito” the son of Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, depicted as a senior Sinaloa leader and central figure in the cartel’s internal power struggle. The article links him to the infamous violent backlash in 2019 after the arrest of his half-brother Ovidio Guzmán López, when gunmen effectively paralyzed a major city and forced the state to reckon with its own vulnerability. What matters now is the reported scale of the current feud: a leadership battle since 2024 that has fueled mass killings. Sinaloa, long mythologized as a cartel with “order,” is shown instead as an incubator for fragmentation, where family names become rallying flags for armed factions. The roster of fugitives stretches beyond Sinaloa and reminds you that Mexico’s underworld is not one war but many. Fausto Isidro Meza Flores, known as “El Chapo Isidro,” is described as a trafficking boss in Sinaloa so elusive that repeated arrests never translated into long-term imprisonment, until he was placed on the FBI’s most-wanted list with a multimillion-dollar reward. That detail matters less as biography than as diagnosis: capture is not the hard part; containment is. The revolving door, whether from corruption, intimidation, or weak institutions, turns “most wanted” into a recurring title rather than an endpoint. Then there is the Gulf Cartel’s enduring machinery along Mexico’s northeastern corridor. Juan Reyes Mejía-González, known as “R-1” or “Kiki” is described as a senior figure within a factional structure, sought for coordinating cocaine flows from South and Central America through Mexico into the United States, with an enormous reward attached. His profile illustrates something often lost in the headlines about fentanyl: legacy trafficking routes remain powerful, and the older cocaine economy still funds violence, bribery, and territorial control. The drug mix changes; the governance problem stays. What El Mencho’s death reveals is not that Mexico is winning, but that it is willing to strike, and that cartels are willing to retaliate at national scale. The immediate question is succession: whether the Jalisco cartel has a disciplined hierarchy ready to absorb the shock, or whether it splinters into competing commanders who will prove legitimacy through blood. Either outcome is dangerous. A stable succession can preserve cartel capacity; a fractured succession can produce chaos that spreads beyond one organization, as rivals invade contested plazas and local communities become bargaining chips. In the end, lists of fugitives are never just lists. They are portraits of an environment where power is both private and armed, and where leadership is inherited, contested, and defended with public terror. Mexico’s crisis is not simply that men like these exist, it is that the state’s authority still has to negotiate with them indirectly, through fear, through emergency deployments, and through the fragile hope that removing one figure will not ignite the next firestorm. The killings and arrests may change names at the top. The deeper question, whether Mexico can dismantle the cartel economy that keeps producing replacements, remains unanswered.
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